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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
for denying rescission 34 or as subjecting the minor to a countersuit for
damages arising from the deceit.3 5
After all factors are considered, therefore, it would seem to be the
better view that a surgeon should be allowed to introduce evidence as to
an actual consent by a minor, particularly one approaching maturity and
the age of discretion, if not as an absolute defense then at least for the
purpose of providing a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury
when awarding damages. To do otherwise would be to allow a minor to
make a profit from participating in the very tort itself.
J. E. EDMONDSON
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUBSTITUTED SERVICE UPON THE PER-
SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF A DECEASED NoN-RESIDENT AUTOMOBILE OWNER
UNDER A STATUTE PROVIDING FOR SUCH SERVICE UPON A NON-RESIDENT
OWNER OR OPERATOR--The extent to which substituted service may be
utilized in automobile accident cases was put in issue in the recent Ohio
case of In Re Wilcox' Estate.' Therein, a resident of Colorado had been
involved in an automobile accident in Ohio after which he returned home
and died shortly thereafter. The present claimants sought an adjudication
of this matter before an Ohio tribunal and, for this purpose, they at-
tempted to obtain jurisdiction over the personal representative of the
deceased under the so-called substituted service statute.2 The Court of
Appeals of Ohio, in reversing the trial court, held that a statute providing
for substituted service upon a non-resident owner or operator of an auto-
mobile by serving process upon the Secretary of State did not authorize
such service upon the personal representative of one who was subject to
this statute.
Since the adoption in 1908 of the first statute subjecting non-resident
84 Young v. Daniel, 201 Ky. 65, 255 S. W. 854 (1923), noted in 72 U. of Pa. IL
Rev. 450.
35 Berryman v. Highway Trailer Co., 307 Ill. App. 480, 30 N. E. (2d) 761 (1940),
noted In 19 CHICAGo-KENT LAw RLvizw 302.
1 -Ohio App.-, 137 N. E. (2d) 301 (1955).
2 Ohio Rev. Code, 1953, § 2703.20, which provides: "Any non-resident of this state,
being the operator or owner of any motor vehicle who accepts the privilege ex-
tended by the laws of this state to non-resident operators and owners, of operating
a motor vehicle or of having the same operated within this state . . . by such ac-
ceptance or licensure and by the operation of such motor vehicle within this state
makes the secretary of state of the state of Ohio his agent for the service of process
in any civil suit or proceeding instituted In the courts of this state against such
operator or owner of such motor vehicle, arising out of. any accident or collision oc-
curring within this state In which such motor vehicle is involved."
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
motorists to the jursidiction of the state whose highways they use,8 all the
rest of the American states, as well as the District of Columbia, have en-
acted such statutes.4 Such statutes were at first held unconstitutional, 5
but since the decision in the case of Hess v. Pawloski,6 they have consist-
ently been sustained.
This determination, plus others fortifying its position, led to the cases,
such as the instant case, where substituted service was attempted upon the
personal representative of a non-resident motorist.7 In construing the
statute here involved, the court took the position that an agency was cre-
ated with the Secretary of State as agent, and the non-resident motorist
as principal. Applying a well recognized principle of law, the court de-
cided that this agency was revoked by the death of the principal. Once
holding that the Secretary of State is no longer an agent, it then appears
that there is no one within the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts who is
amenable to service of process in this action. Other courts, in construing
similar statutes, have taken the view that they must be strictly construed
and, therefore, have not permitted such service upon the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased non-resident motorist. No matter which view was
taken, the courts have unanimously held that such service was not proper.
Therefore, it is easily seen that the death of a non-resident motorist de-
feated the purpose of these statutes in that residents of the state in which
the accident occurred were forced to go to other states to seek redress for
their injuries. To remedy this defect several states have amended such
laws by binding the deceased motorist's personal representative to service
of process in the same manner as the motorist could have been served had
he survived or by providing for the survival of a pending action in per-
sonam against said foreign personal representative.8
3 New Jersey Laws 1908, Ch. 304, p. 613.
4 A collection of these statutes appears In Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832
(1947), and also in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 231.
5 Hendrich v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 885 (1915);
Shusareba v. Ames. 255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931).
6 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
7 Brown v. Hughes, 136 F. Supp. 55 (1955) ; Fazio v. Amer. Auto Ins. Co., 136 F.
Supp. 184 (1955) ; Hendrix v. Jenkins, 120 Supp. 879 (1954); Warner v. Maddox,
68 F. Supp. 27 (1947) ; Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (1945) ; Brogan v. Maclin,
126 Conn. 92, 9 A. (2d) 499 (1939); Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r., 279 Ky. 361, 130
S. W. (2d) 816 (1939) ; Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N. W. 278 (1940) ;
Young v. Potter Title & Trust Co. 115 N. J. L. 518. 181 A. 44 (1935) ; Lepre v. Real
Estate-Land Title Trust Co., 11 N. J. Misc. 887, 168 A. 858 (1933); Vecchione v.
Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N. Y. S. 537 (1936) ; Dowling v. Winters, 208 N. C.
521, 181 S. E. 751 (1935); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N. E. (2d) 522
(1944) ; Donnelly v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N. E. (2d) 888 (1936) ; Quinn v.
Revoir, 3 D. & C. (2d) 682 (1955) ; McElroy v. George, 76 D. & C. 231 (1951) ; State
ex rel. Ledin v. Davidson, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N. W. 718 (1934), 96 A. L. R. 589.
8 For example, Pope's Ark. Stat. 1944, Supp.. § 1375; Fla. Stat. Ann., 1949 Supp. Ch.
47, § 47.29(2) ; Iowa Code 1946, VoL 1, Ch. 321, §§ 321.498-9; Md. Ann. Code (Flack),
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A possible solution to the problem in the instant case was given in the
case of Furst v. Brady,9 where the deceased non-resident motorist carried
an insurance policy which protected him from loss due to his automobile
accident. The court there treated the policy as an asset in the state where
the suit was brought and allowed recovery against an ancillary administra-
tor. In the case at hand, the deceased had a similar policy, and the claim-
ants attempted to have an ancillary administrator appointed for purposes
of reaching this policy to satisfy their claims in their home state. The
court did not allow this appointment, and refused to treat the policy as
an asset in the state where suit was brought, thereby turning away from
the above suggested solution.
The increasing use of automobiles and accidents connected therewith
seems to point to the necessity of a new concept in the law, especially since
the more violent the accident the greater the chance of death for those in-
volved. Therefore, the frequency of these deaths will give rise to more and
more actions similar to the instant case. The legislature of Ohio, appre-
ciating these facts and recognizing the need for conferring such jurisdic-
tion, has followed the modern trend and passed an amendment to its so-
called substituted service statute and personal representatives of deceased
non-resident motorists may now be served in that manner.'0 The most
salient aspect of this case lies in the fact that the legislature recognized
the inadequacy in its state law and immediately stepped into the breach
and remedied the situation.
N. A. ZIMMERMAN
CORPORATIONs-ACTIoNs BETwEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND OFFICERS OR
AGENTs-W =ETERm PERSONAL RECOVERY BY FORMER SHAREHOLDER IS
ALLOWABLE IN ACTIONS AGAINST OFFICER FOR MISAPPROPRIATION Or COR-
PoRATE AssETs-The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was recently faced with the problem of whether a former shareholder
might be allowed an individual recovery against an officer of the corpo-
ration in the case of Watson v. Button.' Therein, the former owner of
one-half of the corporate stock brought an action against the former gen-
1939, Art. 56, § 186.189; Mich. Stat. Ann., 1949 Cum. Supp., § 9.2103; Neb. Rev. Stat.
1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 25, Art. 5, § 25-530 as amended in 1949; Thompson's Laws N. Y.,
1945 Supp., Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 52, p. 725; Wis. Stats. 1949, Ch. 85 § 85.05(3).
The constitutionality of these statutes has been upheld in such cases as: Plopa v.
DuPre, 327 Mich. 606, 42 N. W. (2d) 777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N. Y. 434,
91 N. E. (2d) 876 (1950).
9375 Ill. 425, 31 N. E. (2d) 606 (1940), noted in 19 CMCAGo-KENT L,&w R~wew
293.
10 Legislative Acts and Joint Resolutions of the State of Ohio, 1955-56, p. 49.
1235 F. (2d) 235 (1956).
